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EVIDENCE
CHARLES H. RANDALL, JR.:
Hearsay
Conduct as Hearsay. In Prince v. C. Y. Thomason Co.,'
a workmen's compensation case, decedent was killed while
on his way to the town of Ninety Six where his employer's
company was beginning a construction project. Decedent was
supervisor for the project. At the hearing before the Com-
missioner, testimony indicated that post hole diggers were
necessary and useful for his work at the site, and that dece-
-dent's pick-up truck,2 in which he was killed, carried such
equipment at the time of his death. Decedent was killed early
on a Monday morning. Evidence was admitted over objection,
that on the previous Friday, decedent had picked up some
twine and post hole diggers at the company's supply house,
and had ordered an employee of the company, one Spires, to
meet him at Ninety Six at 7 A.M. on the following morning.
Another witness testified that on the same Friday decedent
had borrowed a pair of post hole diggers that he then declared
were to be used to lay out the job at Ninety Six. It was ob-
jected that the statements of deceased were not made im-
mediately prior to his departure, and, therefore, should have
been ruled incompetent. 3 The Supreme Court, per Mr. Justice
Taylor, affirming a finding that the accident was in the
course of employment, held that the acts of obtaining the
equipment were "certainly competent" as they were acts in
connection with his duties and not merely declaratory state-
ments revealing his intentions. It might be equally cogently
argued that the directions to Spires to join him in Ninety Six
*Professor of Law, University of South Carolina.
1. 236 S. C. 215, 113 S. E. 2d 742 (1960).
2. Decedent owned the truck under an arrangement whereby the com-
pany paid him rental on it, as well as running expenses and repairs ex-
pense.
3. Appellant relied on Erwin v. Myrtle Grove Plantation, 206 S. C. 41,
32 S. E. 2d 877 (1945) which held admissible statements made by a dece-
dent just prior to departure, as to the purpose of the proposed journey.
In that case the Court said (obiter) that probably the better view as to
the effect of the element of time between the statements and the depart-
ure is, not that the statements be so close to the departure as to be a part
thereof, but that there be such proximity as will furnish reasonable as-
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were "acts" in connection with his duties. In both instances,
the case would seem to be a clear one for using this circum-
stantial evidence approach, rather than classifying the con-
duct as tantamount to declarations of intention of the de-
ceased.4
Declarations of Intention. As to the declarations made at
the time of acquisition of the equipment in the Prince case,
the Court found that this evidence was at most cumulative,
since there was an abundance of competent evidence to sup-
port the finding toward which the offer of evidence was
directed. Thus the Court avoided the necessity of deciding
the question which it posed in the Erwin case.5
In Corley v. South Carolina Tax Comm'n a similar ques-
tion arose. This action was also a workmen's compensation
case, in which decedent was killed in an automobile accident
on his return from a "Big Thursday" football game held
during State Fair week in Columbia. Decedent was employed
as a field agent by the Commission, and it was argued that
his trip to Columbia was motivated partly by the desire to
accomplish Commission business, thus bringing the trip with-
in the "dual purpose trip" doctrine.7 Decedent's statements
as to the business purpose of the trip were admitted into
evidence. Admissibility of this evidence was conceded, s but
the Court, per Mr. Justice Oxner, reversed the finding of
the Industrial Commission that the trip was in the course of
employment, and dismissed the complaint. The Court found
that the evidence as to intention to go on business was com-
pletely rebutted by decedent's subsequent conduct, citing Dean
McCormick's observation that "for many reasons the cup
of intention and the lip of action may never meet."9
Admissions. Hunter v. Hyder ° was an action brought by
Hunter alleging that defendants entered his land, destroyed
4. McCoRMicx, EvIDENCE § 229 (1954), discusses the problem, the
learned author concluding as does Justice Taylor in the instant case that
the circumstantial evidence approach is preferable. The test of admissi-
bility then becomes the usual test of relevancy of the offered evidence.
5. Supra, note 3.
6. 237 S. C. 439, 117 S. E. 2d 577 (1961).
7. Sylvan v. Sylvan Bros., Inc., 225 S. C. 429, 82 S. E. 2d 794 (1954).
8. Under the Erwin case, supra, note 3.
9. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 270 (1954). Justice Oxner cites with ap-
proval Dean McCormick's discussion beginning on page 575 of his text on
the weight to be accorded such declarations of intention in testing the
sufficiency of the evidence to support a finding that the intention was
carried out.
10. 236 S. C. 378, 114 S. E. 2d 493 (1960).
2
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fences thereon, and cut and removed timber therefrom. De-
fendant Wyatt owned the land adjoining the plaintiff's tract,
and sold his interest in the timber thereon to defendant Hyder.
Hyder contracted with one Sam Walker to cut the timber.
Plaintiff introduced testimony to the effect that after Walker
cut timber and destroyed the fences on plaintiff's tract,
plaintiff talked with Walker, and as a result of the conver-
sation, Wyatt and Hyder came to see him. Wyatt then said,
"I thought the wood foreman had gotten drunk and had got-
ten over on it and I wanted to straighten it up." Plaintiff
also testified that he talked with Wyatt on the phone several
times, asking him to fix the fence, and Wyatt told him that
he would get in touch with Hyder and "the boys that tore
it down" and tell them to fix it." At the trial, defendants
took the position that Walker was an independent contractor
for whose acts they were not responsible. The Supreme Court,
in an opinion by Mr. Justice Moss, affirmed a judgment for
the plaintiff, and held the statements were admissible as
"a declaration against interest and as an admission of lia-
bility for the trespass committed."' 2 The Court also refers
to the statements of Wyatt as "declarations or admissions
against his interest."' 3  Courts frequently speak in these
terms, thus confusing the two independent exceptions to the
hearsay rule, the exception for declarations against interest
and that for admissions. 14 It is clear that here the declara-
tions against interest exception does not apply, if only because
the requirement of unavailability of the declarant is not
met.'5 As to the admissions exception, which the Court here
is applying, there should be no requirement that the declara-
tion or statement be against interest when made,' 6 although
such statements as the opponent wishes to introduce are
usually against interest.
Hunter v. Hyder also involved the admissibility of state-
ments which Walker, alleged by defendants to be an inde-
11. The argument that these conversations constituted an offer of com-
promise and hence were inadmissible as privileged was rejected. See be.
low, text at note 47.
12. 236 S. C. at 388, 114 S. E. 2d at 498.
13. 236 S. C. at 387, 114 S. E. 2d at 498.
14, MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE Ch. 27, "Admissions of a Party Opponent,"
and Ch. 28, "Declarations Against Interest" (1954).
15. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE §§ 253, 257 (1954). Dean McCormick ex-
presses agreement with Dean Wigmore that the line should be clearly
drawn between the two exceptions to the hearsay rule. In the Hyder case,
both Hyder and Wyatt were defendants and testified at the trial.
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pendent contractor, and not a party to the action, made to
the plaintiff. Mr. Walker was alleged to have said he would
send some men down to plaintiff's place. Defense counsel
objected to this conversation being admitted, and the trial
court ruled that if Walker were an agent, the statement was
admissible. Most of the argument between court and counsel
turned on whether plaintiff had pleaded agency; the trial
court ruled that the pleadings should be liberally construed,
and permitted evidence of agency.17 On this issue, the Su-
preme Court affirmed, and held that the agency issue was
properly involved in the. case. If Walker were found by the
jury to be an agent, the Court said, "his acts, declarations or
admissions, within the scope of his agency, [are] competent
evidence against his principals."'18 It would seem that the
issue could have been disposed of on the simpler ground that
little concerning the conversation with Walker came out on
direct anyway; most of it came out on cross-examination. 19
However, several theories might support the ruling of the
Court that the declarations were admissible.2 0 First, it could
be argued that they were "res gestae" - statements made
at the time of and in conjunction with acts then being per-
formed in the scope of the agent's duties. Second, it could
be argued that the agent was authorized to make the state-
ments, tested by pure agency principles. Dean McCormick
suggests a broad phrasing of the exception that seems to find
support from Mr. Justice Moss' statement in the instant case
- if the declaration concerns a matter within the scope of
the agent's employment, and was made before termination of
the agency, it is admissible.
Admissions of Fault. In Beasley v. Ford Motor Co.,21 an
issue was raised as to the sufficiency of the evidence of neg-
ligence to go to the jury. A Lincoln automobile sold to plain-
tiff's husband by a dealer of defendant developed a fire under
the hood while the car was being driven in heavy traffic.
The car was inspected by the dealer after the fire, and a few
days later, plaintiff's husband was called to the dealer's place
of business and there introduced to one Hodges, an alleged
representative of defendant. Hodges admitted to the husband
17. REcORD, p. 21.
18. 236 S. C. at 387, 114 S. E. 2d at 497.
19. RECoRD, p. 21, on direct examination, and pp. 34-35 on cross-exam-
ination.
20. McCoRmicx, EvmENcE § 244 (1954).
21. 237 S. C. 506, 117 S. E. 2d 863 (1961).
1961]
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that the mishap was the fault of the auto company; another
representative of defendant made the same admission some
time later. No objection was raised to these admissions. The
Supreme Court in an opinion by Chief Justice Stukes, held
that whatever question of sufficiency to carry the case to the
jury might exist otherwise, these admissions sufficed to resist
the motion for a directed verdict. The Court then commented:
.. . Incidentally, if proper objection to the evidence of
the admissions had been preserved, a nice question would
be presented because of the nature and form of them.
20 Am. Jur. 462, Evidence, sec. 548; Annotation, 118
A. L. R. 1230; Piedmont Mfg. Co. v. Columbia & Green-
ville Railroad Co., 19 S. C. 353.
22
The "nice question" referred to by the Chief Justice is the
question whether a statement otherwise admissible as an ad-
mission is rendered incompetent because it is in the form
of an opinion of the declarant. The opinion rule requires a
witness on the stand to state what he observed, and not to
testify to his opinions or mere conclusions.2 3 In the instant
case, the out-of-court declarant has made a statement of
opinion as to the "fault" for the fire under the hood of the
car. It would seem to be the better view that the opinion
rule is inapplicable to such declarations.24 In the case of the
witness on the stand the statement can generally be restated
in a form that will qualify for admission into evidence; how-
ever, it is apparent that the out-of-court declarant cannot be
asked to restate his remarks in a form that will qualify. Thus
the choice is between taking the remark as made or rejecting
the testimony entirely. Thus the writers urge that the opinion
rule, sound when applied as a rule of testimonial preference
regulating the manner in which a witness may testify on the
stand,23 has no proper place as a test for the admissibility
of hearsay statements. A variant of the opinion rule is the
objection that opinions which are conclusions on the ultimate
issue in the case, such as fault in the instant case, should not
be permitted.2 6 This objection is likewise considered to be
hypertechnical and unsound.
22. Id. at 510, 117 S. E. 2d at 865.
23. McCoRmcK, EvIENCE §§ 11, 12 (1954).
24. Id. § 241.
25. Supra, note 23.
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Impeachment - Prior Consistent Statements to Rehabili-
tate. Burns v. Clayton27 was a per curiam decision involving
review of a disbarment proceeding. A witness, Tyner, testi-
fied that one of the respondent lawyers had agreed to pay
him a portion of any fee that would be recovered in a pending
tort liability case at which Tyner would testify. Tyner, who
had not seen the accident, was to testify as an eye-witness.
In November, 1957, Tyner had executed an affidavit con-
taining details as to the accident. On January 6, 1958, Tyner
executed an affidavit for a police officer which stated that
he had not seen the accident, and that earlier statements had
been procured from him for money. Tyner so testified at the
hearing before the Commissioners on Grievances. His credi-
bility was vigorously impeached by counsel for one of the
respondents, impeaching evidence including prior inconsis-
tent statements made by Tyner to others. Impeaching counsel
suggested that Tyner's testimony at the trial and his affi-
davit to the policeman were motivated by promises to him.
To rehabilitate the witness, counsel on re-direct called one
Mills, who testified to declarations by Tyner to him consistent
with his affidavit to the police officer. Tyner had shown
this witness a copy of the first affidavit, and had told him
that this statement was a falsehood. The Supreme Court
held that this testimony was properly admitted to corroborate
Tyner's testimony.28 In theory, of course, this testimony is
not admissible as substantive evidence under an exception to
the hearsay rule, but rather as bearing only on the credibility
of the witness' in-court testimony.29
In State v. Harriso30 defendants were convicted of ag-
gravated assault and battery on an indictment charging also
rape and assault with intent to rape. The Supreme Court up-
held admission of statements which the prosecutrix had made
to her mother some two hours after the assault. Such testi-
mony is limited to the time and place of the occurrence, in
corroboration of the testimony of the prosecutrhx; details be-
yond time and place, and the fact that the event occurred, are
not admissible. If the prosecutrix does not testify, the decla-
27. 237 S. C. 316, 117 S. E. 2d 300 (1961).
28. Dean McCormick indicates that this use of prior consistent state-
ments to rehabilitate the witness is at least proper where the impeaching
evidence suggests a charge of a plan or contrivance of the witness to give
false testimony. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 49 (1954).
29. Id. § 39.
30. 236 S. C. 246, 113 S. E. 2d 783 (1960).
19611
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rations are inadmissible, since the foundation for admissi-
bility is their use in corroboration of the prosecutrix's testi-
mony.
Confessions
In State v. Outen,8 1 appellant, a Negro man, was convicted
of rape and sentenced to death. A portion of his statement
given to police officers shortly after he had been arrested
and identified by the prosecutrix, which statement had been
reduced to writing in question and answer form, was offered
in evidence at the trial. The statement contained a detailed
account of his raping of the prosecutrix. It also contained
the following:
"Q. Walter, we have had lots of complaints about a man
prowling around homes at night in that community. Have
you been going out without shoes and watching white women
in their homes in that community before?"
"A. No, sir."
'32
The statement in its entirety was offered by the solicitor
as a confession. Counsel for defendant objected to the quoted
portion, and the solicitor agreed to and did delete it from
the statement by physically cutting it out. On the solicitor's
renewing his offer of the statement in its expurgated form,
counsel again objected, this time on the ground that the con-
fession was not complete since a portion had been deleted.
The trial judge admitted the statement, and the Supreme
'Court affirmed. Mr. Justice Moss observed that the confes-
sion as amended contained only those parts material to the
crime, and in this particular confession, the competent could
be separated from the incompetent parts without twisting
or distorting the pertinent parts. The rule permits the de-
fendant where only part of the confession is admitted to put
in evidence the entire confession relating to the controversy,
including exculpatory or self serving declarations therein.83
On reversal for new trial in State v. Britt,34 discussed in
last year's survey,35 defendants Britt and Westbury were
again tried jointly and found guilty of the murder of a police
officer and were sentenced to death. On appeal the convic-
tions were affirmed. Many questions regarding the unfair-
31. 237 S. C. 514, 118 S. E. 2d 175 (1961).
32. Id. at 530, 118 S. E. 2d at 183.
33. MCCORmICK, EVIDENCE § 56 (1954).
34. 237 S. C. 293, 117 S. E. 2d 379 (1961).
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ness of denial of separate trials were again raised. Once
again defendant Westbury objected to the admission against
Britt of the confession of the latter. That confession con-
tained the assertion by Britt that Westbury had fired the
fatal shots. Britt did not take the witness stand. The Court
held that the admission of the confession was proper where
the trial court had repeatedly admonished the jury that it
must consider this confession as evidence only against the
defendant Britt. 36
In State v. Harrisons7 once again 38 a trial court permitted
the preliminary examination to determine the voluntariness
of a confession to be made in the presence of the jury. The
Court then found the confession admissible based on evidence
showing that the statements had been freely and voluntarily
made. No evidence was presented to the contrary. The Su-
preme Court affirmed, but again admonished that the better
practice is to conduct such examinations in the absence of
the jury.
In State v. Graham3 9 the statement of one Holland, co-
defendant in the case, as to his whereabouts when the fire
which was the basis of the criminal prosecution occurred,
and as to when he had last been on the third floor of the
hotel where the fire started, was admitted into evidence. This
statement had been given to police officers while Holland
was in custody. It was objected that the statement was a
confession and inadmissible because given under duress and
because proper limiting instructions were not given the jury.
The Supreme Court affirmed, resting admissibility on the dual
ground that the statements did not constitute a confession
since there was no acknowledgment of guilt,40 and that the
statements were freely and voluntarily made.
Relevancy
As usual, the past term of court offers a sampling of cases
raising points concerning the relevancy of offered evidence.
36. This is the orthodox rule, McCoRmIcK, EVIDENCe. § 59 (1954); al-
though it has not been free of criticism. See Id. note 6, discussion by
Judge Learned Hand, and dissent of Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Paoli v.
United States, 352 U. S. 232, 247 (1957).
37. Supra, note 30.
38. State v. Chasteen, 228 S. C. 88, 88 S. E. 2d 880 (1955) is a leading
case.
39. 237 S. C. 278, 117 S. E. 2d 147 (1961).
40. Dean McCormick expresses the view that "it is unreasonable to make
a difference in the ultimate rule of exclusion for involuntary confessions
and involuntary admissions," although he would permit procedural dif-
ferences in the two cases. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 113 (1954).
19611
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The orthodox test of relevancy of an offered item of evidence
considers first whether the item is logically relevant, that is,
whether it has any tendency in reason to prove or disprove
the existence of any material fact.41 If this test is satisfied,
then the further question arises whether reception of the
evidence would be unwise because of a counter-factor of pro-
bative danger. These counter considerations include the like-
lihood of the offered evidence tending to consume undue time,
create substantial danger of prejudice or of confusing the
issues in the case or misleading the jury, or unfairly surpris-
ing the party against whom the evidence is offered.42 The
probative value of the evidence is weighed against these risks.
This analytical approach leads to an understanding of many
of the specific rules which courts have developed to govern
legal relevancy.
Experiments. In Beasley v. Ford Motor Co.43 an issue was
raised as to the cause of a fire which started under the hood
of plaintiff's automobile. The defense offered to conduct an
experiment in court, intended to show that gasoline in con-
tact with a hot metal surface will not ignite. Defendant pro-
posed to use an ordinary hot plate, with his expert witness
making the demonstration. The trial court, upon objection,
refused to permit the experiment. The Supreme Court af-
firmed. The Court cited the orthodox rule that to be admis-
sible an experiment must be conducted under conditions sub-
stantially similar to those in the facts under investigation and
that the trial judge has an ambit of discretion in determining
whether this condition has been met. A hot plate was, in the
view of the Court, "hardly comparable to the hot automobile
motor under the hood of it; nor was there any evidence of
the temperature which the hot plate would reach, whether
comparable to the motor." 44
Far more likely to result in abuse and possible confusion
of the trier of fact are those experiments conducted ex parte
out of court; but these, also, have been held admissible where
the appropriate foundation of substantial similarity of con-
ditions has been laid.43 In State v. Langley46 one of the de-
41. This is the terminology of the UNIFORM RuLE OF EVIDENCE 1 (2).
42. UNIFORAM RULE OF EVIDENCE 45; McCoRMIcK, EVIDENCE § 152(1954).43. Supra, note 21.
44. 237 S. C. 506, 510, 117 S. E. 2d 863 865 (1961).
45. McCoRMICK, EVIDENCE § 169 (19545.
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fendants was alleged to have sold vodka to the prosecuting
witness, who identified her as having made the sale. The
sale took place through a partition, which was about ten
inches wide and five or six inches high. At the trial, the de-
fendant who allegedly made the sale was asked by her counsel
whether she had ever tried to identify anyone looking through
that partition, when standing approximately where the prose-
cuting witness had stood. The trial court, on objection by the
solicitor, did not permit answer to the question. The Supreme
Court per curiam affirmed, holding that the foundation to
show substantial similarity of conditions had not been laid.
The Court indicated that even had the testimony been admit-
ted, it could not have affected the result because of the sub-
stantial testimony and exhibits in evidence on the same point.
Offer to Compromise. In Hunter v. Hyderi7 an action for
trespass on plaintiff's land and cutting of trees thereon, testi-
mony was introduced to the effect that one of the defendants,
one Wyatt, said that he would get a man who was a timber
agent to come down to plaintiff's place and check on the
damage. It was objected to this testimony that it constituted
an offer to compromise, and should have been excluded, since
the law favors such compromises of disputes, and testimony
relating thereto is ordinarily inadmissible.48 The Court held
that this did not constitute an offer to compromise, but an
admission. 49
Character in Issue. In State v. Outen50 the defense put
character in issue by presenting testimony of a witness that
he had known defendant for a number of years and knew
him to be of good reputation. Defense counsel then asked
whether defendant had helped members of the witness' family
at times, and over objection the witness was permitted by
the trial court to answer that defendant helped the witness'
mother do some painting, and did yard work for witness'
mother. The trial court held too general a question asking
the witness for "anything else about [defendant's] family sit-
uation and surroundings that you can enlighten us about?"' 1
On appeal defendant listed as an exception the limitation of
47. Supra, note 10.
48. This rule is based on privilege and not irrelevancy, of course, al-
though as Dean McCormick points out, courts and writers have frequently
classified the rule as one of relevancy. McCORMIcK, EvrDNCE § 76 (1954).
49. Supra, note 10.
50. Supra, note 31.
51. 237 S. C. 514, 523, 118 S. E. 2d 175, 179 (1961).
1961]
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his development of character of the accused. The Supreme
Court in affirming the ruling below noted that while general
character was admissible, particular acts to show character
were not, and hence defendant had been permitted more than
the requisite scope in developing character. 52 Another wit-
ness was not permitted to answer defense counsel's question
whether he thought the defendant was "the kind of person to
get into this kind of difficulty."'5 s Upholding this ruling, the
Supreme Court found that expressing an opinion on defen-
dant's guilt was not proper under the character rule. 4
Demonstrative Evidence - Laying a Foundation. In a
prosecution for burning a hotel with intent to defraud an
insurance company, an exception was taken to admission in
evidence of a can cap and a pair of gloves. State v. Graham.,,
Both articles had been found by firemen immediately after
the fire. Appellants claimed that these objects were in no
way connected with them. The Court held that the can cap
was admissible as a link in the chain of evidence establishing
the corpus delicti; admission of the gloves was held proper
since testimony had indicated that one of the defendants had
been seen wearing similar gloves previously.
In State v. Puckett,66 a prosecution for conspiracy to break
into a store, attempting to enter the store with intent to steal,
and possession of certain tools adapted for burglary with an
intent to use them, the solicitor introduced into evidence a
crow bar or halicon tool, which was identified by the witness
highway patrolman as the one he found near the store. No
objection was made to this evidence. Thereafter, the chief
of the fire department of North Augusta was sworn as a
witness, and the crow bar was shown to him. He testified
that his fire station used such instruments, and had had three
of them until recently when one disappeared. He also testi-
fied that the fire department was located in the same building
52. By a rule of relatively recent origin and doubtful expediency, the
only way by which character for this purpose can be proved is by
evidence of reputation. This excludes evidence of specific acts or
blameless life and rules out opinion-evidence as to the character
of the accused for the trait in question based on the witness' knowl-
edge and observation. Reputation-evidence, though muted and
colorless, is thought to have the advantage of avoiding distracting
side-issues as to particular acts and incidents in the past life of the
accused. MCCORMICK, EVIDENcE § 158 (1954).
53. 237 S. C. 514, 525, 118 S. E. 2d 175, 180 (1961).
54. Supra, note 52.
55. Supra, note 39.
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as the police department in North Augusta, and that one of
defendants had worked in the police department there. An-
other crow bar was then offered through the witness for com-
parison, identified as one of the remaining two crow bars in
possession of his fire department. Defendants objected to
admission of the second crow bar. The Supreme Court af-
firmed admission on the technical ground that counsel for
appellant had cross-examined concerning the instrument with-
out reserving his previously made objection,57 but also ob-
served that the testimony was relevant to the issues. This
would appear sound.
In State v. Outen,58 wherein defendant was convicted of
rape, the defense objected to the admission of testimony of
prosecutrix's physician as to the prosecutrix's physical con-
dition the day after the crime. The Supreme Court found
that the time was close enough to the event to justify admis-
sion as tending to prove the commission of the offense.
Use of Blackboard in Argument on Damages. Plaintiff's
counsel in Indemnity Ins. Co. of No. America v. Odom,59 a
wrongful death action, was permitted by the trial court to
multiply on a blackboard the alleged weekly wage of dece-
dent ($58.00) by the number of weeks in a year (52) and
by decedent's life expectancy (35.15 years) to give a product
of approximately $106,000. Counsel argued that this was the
pecuniary loss of the beneficiaries. 0 Defendant objected that
this argument was improper and highly prejudicial, had no
foundation in the evidence, and was based on sheer specula-
tion. The Supreme Court held that this use of the blackboard
was proper within the dictum of the Johnson case.61
Evidence of Excessive Speed. In State v. Cavers,62 wherein
defendant was convicted of reckless homicide, the crucial
issue was whether the defendant's car was proceeding at an
excessive speed at the time of the accident. Many objections
were made by defendant to the admission of evidence offered
57. Infra, note 82.
58. Supra, note 31.
59. 237 S. C. 167, 116 S. E. 2d 22 (1960).
60. It would seem clear that the total so reached should be discounted
and thus reduced to present value, but it does not appear that counsel
raised this question. See discussion of Johnson v. Charleston & W. C. Ry.,
234 S. C. 448, 108 S. E. 2d 777 (1959), in Randall, Evidence, 1960 Survey
of S. C. Law, 13 S. C. L. Q. 335 (1960).
61. Ibid.
62. 236 S. C. 305, 114 S. E. 2d 401 (1960).
19611
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to prove excessive speed, or offered to identify the defen-
dant's car as the same car that had been speeding just before
the collision. The Supreme Court on appeal agreed with the
observation of the trial judge that the evidence of the impact
itself tended inescapably to show excessive speed. Hence the
Court could view the testimony as merely cumulative, and
uphold without extended discussion the rulings of the lower
court. Furthermore, the Court found that some of the rulings
were not properly preserved as exceptions because defendant
cross-examined without reserving an objection. Nevertheless,
the problems raised are of a recurring class, and merit notice
here.
Appellant objected that witnesses were permitted to give
their opinions as to the speed of a car alleged to be that of
the defendant, based on observations up to two miles distant
from the place of the collision. One witness, one and one half
miles from the place of collision, on being approached by de-
fendant's car, was so frightened by the speed of the latter
that he drove off the road. The Supreme Court avoided any
problem of relevancy of observations this far distant from
the impact by stressing that other witnesses testified to speed
at intermediate points, and hence the whole record indicated
continuity of excessive speed. One nice question pointed out
by defendant was that between the points of these observa-
tions by witnesses and the point of impact, and about two-
tenths of a mile from the impact, was a traffic circle through
which the defendant must pass. Since no car could cross the
traffic circle at defendant's alleged rate of speed - one wit-
ness estimated it at ninety miles per hour - it was pointed
out that defendant must have slowed down here. The Court
disposed of the difficulty by taking judicial notice that power-
ful automobiles accelerate rapidly. Defendant's argument
that these witnesses did not positively identify him or his
car was rejected in summary fashion. The Court pointed out
that the witnesses testified to their observations of a two-
toned Lincoln being driven by a colored man; these observa-
tions were made immediately before the impact. Defendant
was a colored man, and admittedly he and his two-toned Lin-
coln were involved in the fatal collision. Hence, the Court
found the evidence of the witnesses' observations sufficiently
connected up to the accident to meet the test of relevancy.63
63. The discussion by Dean McCormick in his text, supra, note 4, indi-
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Procedural Rules
Burden of Producing Evidence - Criminal Case. In State
v. Puckett,64 voluminous testimony, most of it circumstantial
evidence, was offered by the State in the court below. De-
fendants were convicted, the trial court refusing motions for
directed verdicts of acquittal and for judgment non obstante
veredicto. On appeal, counsel urged that the case for the State
was entirely based on circumstantial evidence, and that this
evidence was insufficient to uphold the verdict, "since even if
the jury believed each circumstance offered, the same did
not point to the guilt of the appellants nor was such consis-
tent with their guilt and inconsistent with their innocence."0 85
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of conviction.
Mr. Justice Legge for the Court, quoting the recent opinion
in State v. Littlejohn,66 held that the rule to be applied by
the trial court in determining whether the evidence was suf-
ficient to go to the jury was less stringent than that sug-
gested by defense counsel:
'... . But on a motion for direction of verdict, the trial
judge is concerned with the existence or non-existence
of evidence, not with its weight; and, although he should
not refuse to grant the motion where the evidence merely
raises a suspicion that the accused is guilty, it is his
duty to submit that case to the jury if there be any sub-
stantial evidence which reasonably tends to prove the
guilt of the accused, or from which his guilt may be
fairly and logically deduced. State v. Brown, 205 S. C.
514, 32 S. E. (2d) 825.'67
Professor McCormick approves this view,68 observing that
trial judges "doubtless... do and should apply their standard
more strictly in view of the gravity of the consequences. 069
The same question was raised in State v. Graham,70 where-
in defendants were convicted of setting fire to a hotel with
intent to defraud certain insurance companies. There, two
defendants moved for a directed verdict at the conclusion of
the State's case and again at the close of all the evidence.
64. Supra, note 56.
65. 237 S. C. 369, 373, 117 S. E. 2d 369, 371 (1961).
66. 228 S. C. 324, 89 S. E. 2d 926 (1955).
67. 237 S. C. 369, 374, 117 S. E. 2d 369, 372 (1961).
68. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 321 (1954).
69. Ibid.
70. Supra, note 39.
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The Supreme Court affirmed conviction, with the opinion
of Mr. Justice Oxner again carefully examining the evidence
and applying the test of the Littlejohn case.71 Appellants em-
phasized the fact that the trial judge in passing on the motion
for directed verdict observed that he would be "worried" if
he were on the jury.7 2 The Court rejected the argument that
this aided the case for reversal:
... But any opinion of his as to the weight of the evi-
dence did not require him to direct a verdict. He was
not called upon to determine whether appellants were
guilty. His function was solely to determine whether
the evidence was sufficient to require the submission of
the case to the jury. He, of course, was empowered to set
aside the verdict if he felt there had been a miscarriage
of justice, but this he declined to do.
7 3
Presumption and Burden of Proof. In Strawhorne v. At-
lantic Coast Life Ins. Co.74 an action was brought on a policy
of life insurance for the death of plaintiff's wife. The policy
provided that liability of the company should be limited to
premiums paid if the insured should die by his or her own
hands during the first two years in which the policy was in
force. Insured died as a result of a gunshot wound within
the two year period and the company interposed the defense
of suicide. Substantial evidence pointing toward suicide was
introduced. The facts and circumstances surrounding the
death were largely undisputed, although there was no eye-
witness to the shooting. The trial court entered judgment on
a jury verdict for the claimant, denying defendant's motions
for nonsuit and directed verdict. The Supreme Court re-
versed saying the burden of proof is upon the insurer to
prove the fact of suicide by a preponderance of the evidence:
It is true that where death by violent injury has occur-
red, unexplained, there is a presumption against suicide,
but this is a presumption of law and not of fact. When
evidence as to the fact of suicide is introduced, the pre-
sumption against suicide vanishes and the question must
be resolved upon the evidence. McMillan v. General Am.
Life Ins. Co., 194 S. C. 146, 9 S. E. 2d 562 (1940).75
71. Supra, note 66.
72. 237 S. C. 278, 290, 117 S. E. 2d 147, 153 (1961).
73. Ibid.
74. 238 S. C. 40, 119 S. E. 2d 101 (1961).




Published by Scholar Commons,
SURVEY OF SOUTH CAROLINA LAW
The Court held that, considered in the light most favorable
to the claimant,"" the evidence was susceptible of no other
reasonable hypothesis than that the insured came to her death
by her own hands.
Judicial Notice. None of the instances in which the Court
utilized the judicial notice technique demand extended dis-
cussion. In State v. Cavers"' the Court observed that it was
common knowledge that powerful automobiles accelerate rap-
idly. The automobile in question had been shown to be pro-
ceeding at greatly excessive speed at a point some mile and
a half before the point of collision with another car. Two-
tenths of a mile from the point of collision, however, was a
traffic circle, through which the car could not have passed
without reducing speed. The Court used this "common knowl-
edge" to permit inference that, having passed through the
circle, the automobile in question accelerated and resumed
its excessive speed.
In In re Cogdel 's Estate s appellant was adjudicated an
incompetent based on an examination made by two physicians
some time before the order of the probate court appointing
qualified persons to examine his mental condition as an al-
leged incompetent. The Supreme Court reversed the adjudi-
cation of incompetency, holding it void because the governing
statute79 required examination of the condition of the subject
after issuance of the order of the probate court. Commenting
on the wisdom of the statutory provision, Chief Justice Stukes
stated that it was common knowledge that a person may be
normal mentally at one time, but not at another. In Deese V.
Williams,80 the Court took judicial notice that the Highway
Department has offices in every county in the State.
Waiver of Objection. In Cavers l appellant urged that cer-
tain statements of the solicitor in summation to the jury
76. The Court says that the question was whether or not all the evi-
dence, considered in a light most favorable to the appellant, is susceptible
of any reasonable hypothesis other than that the insured came to her
death by her own hands. This would appear to be an inadvertant desig-
nation of the party entitled to the advantage in the weighing of the testi-
mony, however, for the Court reverses a verdict for the respondent on
the face amount of the policy, and directs entry of judgment for respon-
dent to recover only the premiums paid. Obviously the Supreme Court
weighed the evidence in a light most favorable to respondent, and found
it still insufficient to support the verdict. Ibid.
77. Supra, note 62.
78. 236 S. C. 405, 114 S. E. 2d 562 (1960).
79. CODE or LAws OF SOUTH CAROLINA §§ 32-990, 32-990.2 (1952).
80. 236 S. C. 292, 113 S. E. 2d 823 (1960).
81. Supra, notes 62 and 77.
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were prejudicial. The Court refused to consider the argument
since no objection had been made thereto during the trial,
nor had an exception been taken thereon. In Puckett 2 de-
fendant objected to the admission in evidence of a certain
crow bar. The Supreme Court found the evidence relevant
and admissible, but observed that the cross examination of
the witness through whom the crow bar was admitted, where-
in counsel did not reserve his objection, constituted a waiver
of objection. See the comment elsewhere on the undue tech-
nicality of this rule.83
Witnesses
Questioning by Court. In State v. Harrison4 appellants
urged that they had been prejudiced by the active participa-
tion of the trial judge in the questioning of witnesses. The
Supreme Court, on examination of the record, found that
the questioning was within the proper limits of the trial
judge's power, since the questions did not indicate to the
jury the judge's opinion as to appellants guilt or innocence,
and could not have resulted in prejudice.
Leading Questions. In State v. Outen"5 appellant cited six
instances wherein the solicitor asked questions in what ap-
pellant considered a leading form. In four of these instances
the question was restated by the solicitor after objection by
the defense and a ruling in defendant's favor by the trial
judge; in the fifth, the trial judge on his own motion required
the solicitor to restate the question; and to the sixth, no ob-
jection had been raised at the trial. The Supreme Court
found nio error, noting that wide discretion is vested in the
trial judge in this matter, and that if opposing counsel per-
sistently asks leading questions resulting in prejudice, a
motion for mistrial is appropriate. No such motion had been
made.
82. Supra, note 56.
83. Randall, Evidence, 1960 Survey of S. C. Law, 13 S. C. L. Q. 321
(1960).
84. Supra, note 30.
85. Supra, note 31.
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